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A nonparametric Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is performed on hospitals in the federal state of Saxony 
(Germany) and in Switzerland. This study is of interest from three points of view. First, contrary to most existing work, 
patient days are not treated as an output but as an input. Second, the usual DEA assumption of a homogeneous sample 
is tested and rejected for a large part of the observations. The proposed solution is to restrict DEA to comparable 
observations in the two countries. Finally, hospital beds are treated as a discretionary input in one DEA and as a fixed 
input in the other, and the effect on efficiency is related to differences in hospital planning in Germany and 
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1. Introduction 
There is an increasing interest in comparing the efficiency of national health care systems 
rather than just health care expenditure. The present work purports to provide such a 
comparison with regard to the hospitals of two neighboring countries, Germany and 
Switzerland. The method used to assess relative performance is DEA (Data Envelopment 
Analysis). First, the institutional background of the two hospital sectors is described, followed 
by a characterization of the DEA applied and the two data sets used. The fourth section 
contains a preliminary test for efficiency by juxtaposing each country’s decision making units 
(observations) to a joint reference set. It continues by restricting the sample to those units that 
can be projected on the other country’s efficiency frontier. Also, a test of robustness is 
performed at this stage. In the fifth section, differences between the countries with respect to 
the stringency and payment for hospital services are tested by modifying the DEA. The final 
section presents concludes that the German hospitals exhibit a higher degree of cost 
effectiveness than their Swiss counterparts and that this difference can be traced to 
institutional differences only in part. In Switzerland excess inputs may be used signals 
indicating quality. 
 
2.  The hospital sectors of Germany and Switzerland 
2.1 The  macro  perspective 
Germany is partitioned into 16 federal states, of which five acceded to the Federal Republic of 
Germany in the process of reunification in 1990 from former Eastern Germany. Saxony is one 
of these five states, whose health care system was completely different from and incompatible 
with the one of the eleven old states. This fact together with considerable obsolescence in 
Eastern Germany led to the political decision to entirely restructure the health care system of 
the new states. The modernization of the hospital sector constituted a major challenge, as not 
only replacement investments were overdue but also the state of technology was lagging far 
behind. To finance the process of hospital restructuring, a program was put into action based 
on a special law (Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz, GSG, art. 14), according to which the equivalent 
of some US$ 10,6 bn. will be allocated to the five states of the former Eastern Germany 
through the end of year 2004. The budget state of Saxony thereby amounts to a volume of 
US$ 3,8 bn.  
 
The hospital sector in Germany (and in Saxony as well) is characterized by a hierarchical 
ordering. Hospitals for ordinary care, constituting the lowest level, must have at least two 
specialties. In Saxony, these two have to be a medical and a surgical department which may 
be supplemented by a gynecological and/ or a pediatric division. Hospitals for intermediate 
care  provide services at an already advanced level, featuring all the major diagnostic as well 
as therapeutic facilities. In Saxony, these hospitals contain surgical, medical, gynecological, 
ophthalmologic, otolaryngology, orthopedic, pediatric and urology departments. To meet 
regional demand, they may be supplemented with dermatology, neurology, and psychiatry. 
Hospitals for advanced care offer the full range of treatments available, using newest medical 
technology. They also engage in medical research and education. In addition to these three 
levels of hospitals, there is a fourth group of hospitals that offer specialized care, e.g. for 
cardiac patients (Sächsisches Staatsministerium für Soziales, Gesundheit, Jugend und Familie 
(2000) and (2002)).  
   3
In Saxony, a state with large rural areas, the prime objective in restructuring the health care 
system, and especially the hospital sector, was to provide services of different levels 
according to population density. The outcome of this “location-allocation assignment” 
problem is a large number of hospitals for ordinary care, comprising 300 to 400 beds. This 
differs markedly from the structure prevailing in Germany as a whole, where units with up to 
200 beds are more common (cf. Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Hospital size: Saxony and Germany  
 Saxony  Germany 
up to 200 beds  40.2 %  52.2 % 
300 to 400 beds  20.7 %  11.9 % 
Source: Statistisches Landesamt Sachsen, GBE (2000), Tab. 6.11 
 
Germany has a dual system of hospital finance. Investments are the responsibility of the 
federal state, while operating costs are covered by payments from public and private 
insurance, mainly through per diems. Case-based payments and fee-for-service items make up 
22 to 23 percent of hospital revenue. State governments impose strict hospital planning but 
consult the regional hospital associations and health insurers. 
 
In Switzerland, the 26 cantons (member states) have responsibility to assure the provision of 
health care services, in particular in the hospital domain. However, this does not imply that 
hospital finance comes from cantonal sources only. To the contrary, current hospital 
expenditure is importantly financed by social health insurers, resulting also in a dual system 
of hospital finance.  
 
Hospitals are not distinguished according to a hierarchical level as in Germany, although 
cantons seek to put a degree of division of labor in place. In particular, hospitals are not 
required to have a minimum number of specialties to qualify for a certain functional status; 
the main distinguishing feature is whether or not psychiatric and geriatric care is offered. The 
new federal Law on Social Health Insurance of 1994 (effective 1996) requires cantons to 
specify lists of hospitals that are admitted to provide treatment to individuals insured by one 
of some 200 competing sick funds. However, the criteria used for inclusion in these lists vary 
between cantons, encouraging heterogeneity between hospitals.  
 
This lack of criteria also translates into an absence of stated criteria for ongoing hospital 
planning in most cantons beyond the objective of appropriate provision at the regional level. 
In many instances, even rather rural cantons dispose of facilities that would be deemed to be 
appropriate for advanced care; however, the great majority of patients requiring advanced care 
can reach a teaching hospital in two hours or less. Conversely, hospitals with more than 50 
and less than 100 beds dominate the picture; in the raw Swiss sample, hospitals with less than 
200 beds make up 90 percent of all units.  
 
Contrary to Germany, the financing of hospital investment lies with the cantons rather than 
the confederation. With regard to operating cost, the Law of 1994 obliges insurers to 
contribute at most 50 percent of the cost accruing in the public ward, while cantons have to 
cover the residual. Modes of financing differ. In the majority of cantons, hospitals are paid per 
diem; some are experimenting with prospective per-case payment, and others (notably the 
canton of Vaud) have introduced a global budget to which insurers contribute although it is 
under the control of the state.    4
2.2  The goals of decision makers 
In this section, we briefly describe binding restrictions, optional targets, and incentives of 
decision makers in the German and Swiss hospital sector. The parties involved are public 
agencies, public and private health insurers, hospital management, and patients. 
 
Legal restrictions in Germany and Switzerland are, to some extent, different. They express 
differing social preferences and give rise to differing incentives for decision makers, 
especially for hospital managers.  
 
In Germany, the Hospital Finance Act (KHG, art. 1) mentions appropriateness of provision 
and acceptable per diems as objectives, while the National Ordinance on Hospital Rates 
(BPflV) emphasizes stabilization of contribution rates to public health insurance and 
performance of hospital comparisons. Cost efficiency thus is one of the prevalent official 
objectives. 
 
The decision situation of hospital managers in Saxony can be described as follows. The 
number of beds in each department is fixed in the process of hospital planning. Since shifts 
between departments are not admitted, the number of beds at the department level as well as 
the hospital level amounts to a non-discretionary quantity. Of the total stock, private beds 
account for a minimal share, as a mere 2 percent of Saxony’s population has private 
insurance. Negotiations with the association of public health insurers result in annual budgets 
composed of the per diem and the number of patient days. Therefore, management has a 
degree of discretion over patient days. This degree of discretion is limited by the fact that the 
number of cases are negotiated, too, which implicitly defines a targeted length of stay. If the  
budget target is exceeded, the value of the per diem is reduced. Conversely, if expenditure 
falls short of the budget, the hospital can keep only part of the difference. This means that 
hospital managers have a clear incentive to meet the approved number of patient days. If 
below budget, extending length of stay is difficult because this variable is closely monitored 
by the public agency and health insurers. Increasing the number of cases makes sense only if 
low-cost patients can be attracted. If successful, this policy tends to enhance cost efficiency.  
 
At this point, it should be noted that the Saxon data refer to target rather than actual quantities. 
However, this difference may not be as important as it seems at first sight. First, the 
arguments of the preceding paragraph suggest that hospital managers have strong interest to 
meet targets in terms of patient days, length of stay, and therefore number of cases, at least as 
long targets are within reach. Second, these targets likely remain within reach because they 
result from a negotiation process that starts from realized quantities in the previous period and 
involves comparisons with other, similar units. 
 
Patient choice is hardly reflected in hospital performance, since according to the Social 
Security Code (SGB V), admitting physicians may only choose among the two hospitals 
closest to residence. Otherwise, they must seek the consent of the health insurer. For treatment 
outside the state of residence, the patient has to pay any difference in cost. This makes patient 
migration a rare phenomenon, with only 2% of all patients residing in Saxony receiving cross-
border care. The bulk of patient movement within Saxony is between hospitals of different 
hierarchical level, reflecting medical reasons. Judging from a study of patients with 
cardiovascular disease (see Karmann/Dittrich/Vaillant (2003)), migrations between hospitals 
of the same hierarchical level amount to 4 percent of all migrations only. In sum, patient’s 
choice of hospital is de facto quite limited, providing little incentive for quality competition.    5
In Switzerland, the new federal Law of 1994 stipulates that health insurers may not cover 
more than 50 percent of current expenditure of public wards in publicly owned hospitals 
(excluding costs of excess capacity, investment outlays, and teaching and research).
1 The 
remainder of expenditure and investment outlay must therefore be covered by communities 
forming regional hospital associations and by the cantons. This involvement of cantons in the 
financing of hospitals creates an incentive on their part to control cost. However, this 
incentive is undermined by their ability to shift the burden of hospital deficits to health 
insurers through high fees (which create leeway for cost increases). Cantons can act in this 
way because fee negotiations involve their cantonal hospital association, and in the case of 
failing negotiations, they serve as the ultimate arbiter. In all, cantons have limited interest in 
achieving cost efficiency in the hospital sector. This conclusion is little affected by the fact 
that the new federal law not only confirms the authority of cantons to engage in hospital 
planning but also introduces an obligation to this effect.  
 
Hospital efficiency is attained through a favorable quality-cost ratio, brought about by public 
planning or competition. The new federal Law states effectiveness, appropriateness, and 
efficiency as objectives while explicitly mentioning hospital planning only as a means to 
achieve these ends. On the planning side, hospital associations have limited incentive to resist 
hospital physicians in their quest to increase quality of treatment through investments because 
the canton shares in the investment outlay. Cantons are in a similar situation since higher 
quality attracts patients from other cantons, who are made to contribute through substantially 
higher fees; an estimate for 1994 puts the share of patients crossing cantonal borders for 
treatment at 15 percent (Crivelli, 1998, p. 56), roughly the sevenfold of the figure for Saxony 
which in addition includes migrations within the federal state. With regard to cost, increases 
in current expenditure triggered by their investment decisions are borne up to one-half by 
social health insurers. Insurers, doing business nationwide and regulated to set largely 
uniform premiums, in fact make their members residing outside of the canton in question 
contribute to some extent to hospital costs engendered by that canton. 
 
On the competition side, hospitals again put emphasis on quality because the insured have 
free choice of hospital within their canton of residence, without any implication for premium 
paid or (minimal) cost sharing. Moreover, at least 22 percent of the population (compared to 2 
percent in Saxony) have supplementary health insurance granting mainly hotel-type amenities 
and choice of hospital beyond the canton of residence (Federal Office for Social Insurance, 
2001, p. 143).  
 
Finally, the new federal Law stipulates a premium subsidy for residents designed to limit the 
fraction of income that must be paid for health insurance premiums. This serves to reduce 
pressure by voters to limit premium increases and indirectly the surge of hospital cost. 
Moreover, these subsidies are financed in the guise of matching grants. Cantons are obliged to 
augment federal contributions by at least 50 percent. But they can forego up to 50 percent of 
these contributions, thus reducing their own burden. Thus, implementation of the law varies 
considerably between cantons, whose governments still can let hospital fees increase without 
having to bear more than a small part of the engendered subsidization cost.  
                                                 
1 Health insurers may cover more than 50 percent of expenditure in privately owned hospitals to make up for the 
fact that they are not financed by taxes.   6
Conclusion 1:  In Germany, the hospital remuneration scheme makes patient days the 
primary target variable. Moreover, the fact that the observations are planned 
rather than actual quantities is of minor importance. In Switzerland, quality 
competition is enforced to some extent by patient migration, causing the 
number of cases to be emphasized as an objective. 
 
3.  Characterization of DEA applied and data sets used 
3.1  A specific DEA formulation 
DEA is a procedure for determining efficient frontiers by maximizing a generalized distance 
between inputs and outputs [cf. Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978), for an introduction cf. 
Coelli et al. (1998)]. In the case of a hospital, the definition of outputs is not trivial. First, with 
measurements of the change in health status as the true output lacking, the number of cases 
treated, grouped into clinical categories to control for health status at admission, serve as a 
proxy. In this work, five major patient categories are distinguished (see table 2). Second, the 
number of patient days is often included among the outputs [cf. Burgess and Wilson (1996), 
Färe et al. (1994), Linna (1998)]. However, time spent in hospital amounts to an input 
required by the hospital and provided by patients. This variable thus appears as an input. It 
would have been tempting to divide this total up between the five clinical categories; 
however, the value of a patient day is the (unobserved) opportunity cost of time, which 
presumably does not vary much between a medical and a surgical patient (say), compared to a 
member of the labor force and a child. Moreover, increasing the number of inputs causes 
more observations to be recognized as fully efficient, thus reducing DEA’s discriminatory 
power for a given sample size. In this way, the number of inputs is limited to six, among them 
the number of beds, which has the special feature of being considered non-discretionary. In 
Germany, this variable is set by hospital planning authorities; in Switzerland, this obtains in 
some cantons, at least with regard to beds in the public ward. 
 
The fact that one of the inputs is non-discretionary has implications for the formulation of 
DEA. Contrary to the conventional DEA formulation, the linear program reads, 
  m i n   θl 
 
X
dλ  ≤ θlX
d
l   d: discretionary input 
X
nλ  ≤ X
n
l   n: non-discretionary input 
Yλ   ≥ Yl     
λ ≥ 0   
θl:  efficiency score of observation l under evaluation 
X
d:  k times o matrix of inputs, where k is the number of discretionary inputs and o 
the number of observations (X
d
l is the l
th column of this matrix, the vector of 
discretionary inputs observation l) 
X
n:  j times o matrix of inputs, where j is the number of non-discretionary inputs 
and o the number of observations (X
n
l is the l
th column of this matrix, the 
vector of non-discretionary inputs observation l) 
Y: the  s times o matrix, whereas s is the number of outputs (Yl is the l
th column 
of this matrix, the output vector observation l) 
λ:  o times 1 vector of weights pertaining to observations   7
This is the input-oriented version of DEA because the objective variable relates to inputs; 
constant returns to scale are assumed because the vector λ is not constrained except for being 
nonnegative. This formulation corresponds to a planning view that seeks to guarantee a 
certain level of provision with hospital services for a minimum use of resources. Also, the 
assumption of constant returns to scale permits to split up total inefficiency into technical and 
scale inefficiencies. Thus, the minimum value of θ is sought (equivalent to the maximum 
reduction of all discretionary inputs) that is still compatible with a given production 
possibility set. This factor is not applied to the non-discretionary input (number of hospital 
beds in this case); however, this input continues to enter the determination of the production 
possibility set.  
 
3.2 Description  of  the two data sets 
The German observations refer to Saxony exclusively and cover the years 2000 through 2002. 
They were provided by the Saxon Hospital Association. Out of 123 observations, some had 
missing values for inputs and/ or outputs as defined in section 3.1 and shown in tables 1 and 2 
had to be excluded; on the other hand, a unit did not have to report in all three years to be 
retained in the sample. Furthermore, only observations coming from units that at least satisfy 
the criteria for an ordinary care hospital (as stated in section 2.1) qualify. For increased 
comparability with the Swiss data set, the minimum number of beds is 20, which has the 
consequence of excluding all specialized hospitals that are not part of the standard 
hierarchical structure. The final sample size is 105 observations.  
 
In the case of Switzerland, hospitals report their actual data to cantonal health authorities, who 
forward them to the Federal Statistical Office. The observation period covers the years 1997 
through 2001.While the Office runs a series of plausibility tests in particular with regard to 
outputs, observations were subjected to additional restrictions for retention in the sample 
because some characteristics on the input side did not appear credible. First, cases treated per 
physician have to be nonzero but also less than 1,500 per year for a realistic workload, a limit 
suggested by inspection of the density distribution. Next, annual labor income (in prices of 
1995) has to be more then CHF (Swiss francs) 30,000 (some US$ 20,000 at 2002 exchange 
rates), which corresponds to subsistence level. On the other hand, a hospital would have to 
employ exclusively senior physicians to report an average labor income in excess of CHF 
150,000 (US$ 100,000), which therefore serves as the upper limit. In view of the fact that 
earlier surveys, compiled by the Swiss Hospital Association (H+), had always assigned 
hospitals having less than 75 beds to one category, the lower limit is put at 20 beds to 
eliminate reporting errors. With regard to personnel, an observation must have at least three 
physicians and three nursing staff to qualify. Since every employee is assigned to one of some 
70 categories, which facilitates correct categorization, hospitals featuring more then 5 percent 
non-specified personnel are removed from the sample. Observations reporting nonzero 
geriatric and psychiatric cases are excluded in order to focus on short-term hospitals, in 
parallel with the German data set. These restrictions jointly cause the sample to be reduced 
from some 950 observations on short-term hospitals to 251.    8
Table 2: Hospital inputs, by country  
   Country  
   Germany  Switzerland  total 
mean 82.79 82.30  82.44 Academic staff 
range 368.39 1,660.27  1,660.27
mean 271.23 237.32  247.32 Nursing staff  range 1,176.99 3,573.85  3,573.85
mean 262.46 197.16  216.42 Administrative staff  range 1,158.12 2,481.83  2,481.83
mean 19,069.85 15,834.45  16,788.71 Expenses  range 100,213.57 175,331.22  175,311.22
mean 116,923.52 40,794.89  63.248.56 Patient days  range 526,314.00 362,407.00  556,902.00
mean 434.55 155.58  237.86 Beds  range 1,712.00 1,198.00  1,833.00
Note: Expenses (on materiel and minor investment) in prices of 1995, in Swiss francs  
 
The salient feature of table 2 is that (apart from academic staff) German hospitals use much 
larger quantities of inputs, especially beds. With regard to beds, this is the likely consequence 
of the statistical convention that only staffed beds are counted in Switzerland. On the whole, 
however, one retains the impression that the German units are larger than their Swiss 
counterparts. At the same time, comparison of the ranges indicates Swiss hospitals seem to 
have a large degree of diversity whereas the German sample is much more homogeneous. 
This homogeneity may be a result of hospital planning and the process of hospital 
restructuring East Germany. 
 
Turning to the outputs (table 3), the number of cases treated in German hospitals is 
approximately double that of Switzerland in four out of five categories, which again points to 
larger units. The notable exception is an equal number of surgical cases. Apparently, a 
German hospital is used for a broader range of purposes than its Swiss counterpart, where 
surgery has a comparatively prominent place. Once more, the ranges show Swiss hospitals to 
be characterized by a lot of diversity, which may be the result of strong specialization.  
Table 3: Number of cases treated, by category and country 
   Country  
   Germany  Switzerland  total 
mean 3,402.72 1,686.94  2,193.00 Medical 
range 15,758.00 24,751.00  24,751.00
mean 952.96 389.27  555.53 Pediatric  range 5,734.00 6,828.00  6,828.00
mean 1,144.70 612.33  769.35 Gynecological  range 3,700.00 5,755.00  5,755.00
mean 1,959.66 1,937.36  1,943.94 Surgical  range 6,487.00 17,759.00  17,759.00
mean 645.94 186.55  322.05 Intensive care  range 1,405.00 3,264.00  3,264.00
 
The differences between the two hospital sectors can be highlighted by aggregating outputs 
and using the German data as the benchmark (normalized at 1.00, see table 4). First, a Swiss 
hospital treats only one-half the number of a German unit. If it scaled back inputs in 
proportion to the total number of cases, its input quantities would have to be a multiple of 
0.50 of the German figures. The actual multiples are higher, amounting to 1,00 for academic 
staff, 0.83 for nursing staff and expenses and 0.77 for administrative staff. The one exception 
is the number of patient days, with a multiple of 0.34. This conforms to the differences in   9
incentives noted in Conclusion 1, viz. the importance of patient days as a target variable in 
Germany.  
 
Table 4: Stylized representation of input and output ratios, between countries 
 Germany  Switzerland 
Aggregated outputs  1.00 0.50 
Academic staff  1.00 1.00 
Nursing staff  1.00 0.83 
Administrative staff  1.00 0.77 
Patient days  1.00 0.34 
Expenses  1.00 0.83 
Conclusion 2:  Both input and output quantities suggest that the hospitals of the German 
sample are roughly twice as large as their Swiss counterparts. At the same 
time, they are far more homogeneous, which is remarkable in view of the 
many exclusion restrictions that had to be imposed on the Swiss sample.  
The larger size of German hospitals gives rise to the expectation that the DEA will indicate a 
larger share of units exhibiting constant and decreasing returns to scale in the German 
subsample. 
 
4.  An efficiency comparison between the two hospital sectors 
The objective of this section is to find out whether German or Swiss hospitals are recognized 
as relatively efficient if pitted against their counterparts and to see whether they are subject to 
differing returns to scale. At the beginning, the reference set consists of observations of both 
countries; later on, the efficient frontier is constrained to contain only observations from the 
other country. 
 
4.1  Standard DEA efficiency scores 
For a first comparison, the empirical densities of hospitals with regard to their efficiency 
scores are shown in figure 1, based on the standard DEA assumption that all units belong to 
the same universe. The two densities differ markedly. Neglecting for a moment the fully 
efficient observations (their cumulation being a consequence of DEA), the Swiss distribution 
appears to be unimodal whereas its German counterpart seems to have a second mode around 
a score value of 30 percent. This feature of the German distribution is puzzling because 
assuming that the majority of the observations satisfy the output targets set by hospital 
planning, such a discrepancy would have to reflect widely divergent targets. However, this 
assessment is conditional on the assumption of constant returns to scale, which means that 
observations are held against the most productive units whereas in fact, German hospitals are 
not free to choose their scale. Therefore, the degree of inefficiency shown is made up not only 
of technical but also of scale inefficiency, which emanates from planning rather than 
management failures. 
 
Figure 1 also shows that the German sample has a much higher share of fully efficient 
observations, and that they are concentrated in the upper end of the range. The group 
characterized by full efficiency consists of 73 observations of which 35 are German (48 
percent) and 38 are Swiss hospitals (52 percent), representing 33 and 15 percent of their 
respective samples.    10
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A first explanation of the difference in efficiency is that the German data cover a more recent 
period, therefore mirroring a more advanced state of medical technology and possibly 
management skills. However, a year-by-year DEA shows that the efficiency scores decreased 
rather than increased in both countries (see table 5).  
 
Table 5: Mean efficiency scores, by year and country 
  Mean efficiency (%) 
 Germany  Switzerland 
1997 - 73.74 
1998 - 75.18 
1999 - 73.20 
2000 82.78 71.97 
2001 82.36  - 
2002 79.01  - 
 
Another explanation is the fact that the German data are target rather than realized quantities. 
To the extent that the output targets are difficult to reach, hospital managers have an incentive 
to meet the approved number of days by attracting less costly cases (cf. ch.2.2). This would 
result in an increased efficiency score as long as DEA is not conditioned on case severity. By 
contrast, Swiss hospital managers do not face output targets. If this reasoning were relevant, 
one would expect a higher number of cases treated in Germany for a given population. 
However, in the year 2000 the number of cases treated per 100,000 inhabitants is only 4 
percent larger for Germany compared to Switzerland.
2, which would account for only a small 
part of the efficiency gap. A third reason for the gap may be that the Swiss observations, 
being smaller on average, do not reach the range of constant returns to scale.  
 
Table 6:   Number of observations by returns to scale and country 
    Returns to scale 
   increasing  constant  decreasing 
actual   12  35  58  Germany  expected   43.14  21.5  40.4 
actual   134  38  79  Switzerland  expected   102.9  51.5  96.6 
 
                                                 
2 Comparable figures are available for the four categories medical, pediatric, gynecological, surgical. They add 
up to 15,506 per 100,000 population for Saxony and 14,914 for Switzerland.   11
Indeed, table 6 indicates that the shares of German observations exhibiting increasing, 
constant and decreasing returns to scale are significantly different (based on a chi-square test) 
from their Swiss counterparts. For example, if the two countries had the same distribution, the 
expected number of German observations exhibiting increasing returns to scale would be 
43.14, more than the triple of their actual number of 12. By way of contrast, the expected 
number of observations with increasing returns is below the actual in the case of Switzerland. 
This confirms an expectation based on the observation that German hospitals are clearly 
larger than the Swiss (Conclusion 2). 
 
4.2  Efficiency comparison restricted to comparable observations  
In view of the different institutional constraints facing the two hospital sectors and the 
disparities noted in tables 1 and 2, it seems appropriate to test the standard DEA assumption 
stating that all observations come from one and the same universe. Failing homogeneity, the 
analysis would have to be confined to those observations that are comparable. One way to 
achieve comparability is to retain those observations that can be mutually projected on the 
(Pareto-Koopmans) efficient frontiers. Specifically, the Swiss observations are projected on a 
reference set that is exclusively composed of German observations, and vice versa, the 
German observations are projected on a reference set consisting of Swiss observations only . 
If the projection proves impossible due to a lack of a reference set, an efficiency score cannot 
be assigned, and the observation is excluded from the comparison.  
 
Indeed, a substantial number of Swiss hospitals does not have a reference set defined by 
German observations. A full 67.3 percent of Swiss hospitals cannot be projected on the 
German efficient frontier. This failure can be traced to the very great amount of variety in 
their choices of input-output-mix (see tables 1 and 2). This points to a larger degree of 
specialization among Swiss compared to German hospitals, made possible by lower barriers 
against cross-border care, as argued in section 2.2. Conversely, however, all German 
observations can be projected on their Swiss counterparts.  
 
As a consequence of mutual projection, efficiency scores can exceed the value of 1. For 
example, a score of 125 implies that all inputs could be increased by 25 percent, with the 
observation still remaining efficient. In figure 2 (left panel), the share of German hospitals 
exceeding the unit threshold amounts to 74.3 percent. The share of Swiss hospitals beyond the 
unit threshold is only 12.3 percent (right panel). This confirms the earlier conclusion that the 
German observations are more efficient on average and have a greater relative share of fully 
efficient observations. 
   12
Figure 2: Efficiency scores, mutually projectable observations only  
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Conclusion 3:  The German hospitals are more efficient on average than the Swiss. This 
finding is reinforced when taking into account that two-thirds of the Swiss 
observations cannot be projected on a German reference set, indicating that 
the two sets are largely disjoint.  
This conclusion implies that if the efficiency scores are interpreted on the basis of the 
standard DEA assumption of a joint efficiency frontier while there are group-specific 
frontiers, one measures efficiency differences within the respective reference group. Since 
maximum efficiency is fixed at 1 in both groups, the one with the greater dispersion tends to 
exhibit the lower average efficiency score. Conversely, since a common benchmark does not 
really exist, one fails to measure efficiency differences between groups, which constitute the 
main research objective in an international comparison.  
 
In view of this difficulty, the procedure adopted in the remainder of this paper is as follows. 
First, the set of comparable observations is defined once and for all on the basis of the test that 
leads up to Conclusion 3. Next, additional DEAs continue to be performed on the entire 
sample of comparable observations. Finally, while efficiency scores are calculated for all 
observations, only those pertaining to the set of comparable observations are retained for 
presentation and statistical analysis. Specifically, this applies to those Swiss observations that 
could not be projected on the German reference set.  
 
In keeping with this procedure, mean efficiency scores are calculated once more (see table 7). 
As could be expected, the German observations, which turned out projectable without 
exception, display the same scores as in table 5, where the reference set was still combined. 
By way of contrast, the mean efficiency scores of Swiss hospitals drop by no less than 13 
percentage points. This change is related to the fact that while the number of Swiss 
observations is reduced by two-thirds overall, the reduction with regard to the efficient 
observations is far more marked. Indeed, whereas 38 Swiss observations had been part of the 
combined efficient frontier, now only 3 observations are recognized as fully efficient in the 
reduced set. Thus, depriving observations of the possibility of being compared to observations 
of the same country has a particularly important effect on the Swiss subsample, resulting in 
still lower efficiency scores (see table 7). The resulting differential between the two countries 
increases from 9 to almost 22 percentage points.  
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Table 7: Efficiency scores, projectable observations only 
  Mean efficiency (%) 
 Germany  Switzerland 
1997 - 61.34 
1998 - 62.75 
1999 - 59.91 
2000 82.78 56.88 
2001 82.36  - 
2002 79.01  - 
 
This result calls for an explanation. One possibility is that important (technical) inputs and 
outputs that would have favored Swiss hospitals are lacking. However, the sets of outputs and 
inputs used here are at least as comprehensive as those of other studies that do not have access 
to diagnostic information [Banker et al (1986), Färe et al. (1994), Steinmann and Zweifel 
(2003)]. Another reason may be the fact that patients in Switzerland, in particular those many 
covered by supplementary health insurance, have a larger choice of hospital without being 
exposed to cost differences. To the extent that inputs are valued by patients as relevant 
dimensions of quality, Swiss hospitals must provide them, resulting in excess inputs for a 
given output. 
 
It is difficult to explain the lack of stability over time evidenced both in table 5 and table 7. 
Possibly, the changes in efficiency scores are caused by increasing consumer sovereignty in 
both countries. The difference from -3.35 percentage points from 2001 to 2002 in Germany 
may also be caused by the announcement of DRG implementation starting 2003. Therefore 
the hospitals might have had an incentive to attract more severe cases, resulting in a higher 
case-mix-index. Due to the upcoming change of system, insurers might have been less severe 
in monitoring hospitals. 
 
Another difficulty characterizing international comparisons of performance stems from the 
fact that for inputs and outputs measured in value terms, different currencies are involved. In 
the most simple case, with one input in value terms (as in so-called cost DEA with constant 
returns to scale), calculated efficiency scores depend linearly on the exchange rate chosen. In 
the present study, only one out of six inputs, expenses for materiel and minor investment 
(‘expenses’ in table 2), is expressed in monetary units. Still, it is conceivable that the 
comparison between German and Swiss hospitals could be sensitive to the presence of this 
one input. To test for this possibility, the DEA is repeated with materiel and minor 
investments excluded.  
 
The resulting differences in efficiency scores (new minus previous value) are shown in figure 
3. Since adding to the number of inputs increases the number of variables in the linear 
program, efficiency scores may increase or remain unaffected; conversely, excluding one 
input cannot increase efficiency scores [cf. Chiang (1984), chapter 20]. This theoretical 
expectation is borne out for both countries. Indeed, the new mean value is 3.2 percentage 
points lower in the case of Germany and 6.2 percentage points lower in the case of 
Switzerland. While the difference in these reductions is statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney rank sum test, significance level 1 percent), it confirms the finding that German 
hospitals are more efficient. However, no less than 64 percent (Germany) and almost 42 
percent (Switzerland) of the efficiency scores remain unchanged, and changes exceeding 20 
percentage points are very rare. In fact, the correlation coefficient between the efficient scores 
calculated with and without expenses amounts to 0.96. In view of this robustness of results, 
the choice of exchange rate cannot make much of a difference.    14
Conclusion 4:  In the present DEA, calculated efficiency scores depend heavily on the 
standard homogeneity assumption. On the other hand, they may be 
considered largely robust against the choice of and changes in the exchange 
rate.  








































































































































































5.  Testing for influences of institutional factors 
In this section, two institutional factors that differ between Germany and Switzerland are 
tested. One is the fact that hospital planning is less stringent in Switzerland in general and 
with regard to the number of beds in particular, the other, that the possibility of patient 
migration makes the number of cases an important performance indicator for hospital 
management (Conclusion 1).  
 
5.1  More stringent hospital planning in Germany  
Apart from the regulated number of beds in the public ward, Swiss hospitals are free to build 
beds in the private ward as they see fit. Therefore, they should not be assigned a very much 
higher efficiency score if the number of beds is introduced as a discretionary input variable in 
the DEA. By way of contrast, the relaxation of the bed restriction in the German subset should 
make a marked difference, permitting observations to improve their efficiency score. 
 
As shown in figure 4, the observations of both countries do not feature any decrease in 
efficiency scores, consistent with theoretical expectations. By way of contrast, the 
improvements in efficiency score turn out to be very small: the German scores increase by a 
mere 0.26 percentage points and the Swiss, by 0.67 points. While the German figure is 
smaller, contrary to expectations, the difference is far from statistically significant (Mann-
Whitney test, significance level 67 percent). One possible explanation of this is the fact that 
the share of fully efficient hospitals was higher to begin with in Germany, and relaxation of a 
restriction cannot make them more than fully efficient. Indeed, limiting the analysis to the 
observations that are inefficient initially reveals that the change in efficiency among German 
hospitals now amounts to 0.39 (rather than 0.26) percentage points, whereas it remains almost 
the same (0.69 rather than 0.67 points) among Swiss hospitals.    15
Figure 4: Effect on efficiency of making beds a discretionary input 
Difference  Discretionary/Nondiscretionary



























Relaxing the constraint on the numbers of beds has a surprisingly small effect in both 
countries, suggesting that regulating the number of beds hardly affects hospital efficiency as 
measured by DEA.  
 
5.2  Patient days as an output measure in Germany 
The other institutional difference is that in Germany patient days served as a principal output 
measure until recently (DRG payment introduced 1 January 2003). By way of contrast, the 
possibility of patient migration makes the number of patient days an important performance 
indicator for Swiss hospitals. Therefore, when switching hospital days from inputs to outputs 
in DEA, the German observations should be more likely to show an efficiency increase than 
their Swiss counterparts. In figure 5, 50 percent of Swiss and 48.6 percent of German 
hospitals have increased efficiency, a statistically nonsignificant difference. However, the 
average increase amounts to 6.6 percentage points among German hospitals but 2.6 
percentage points among the Swiss ones, and this is a statistically significant difference 
(Mann-Whitney test, 5 percent level of significance). 
3 
Conclusion 5:  Based on the fact that patient days relative to cases treated have been a more 
important performance indicator for German than for Swiss policy, counting 
patient days among the outputs in DEA should increase German efficiency 
scores more than the Swiss. This prediction is confirmed. 
                                                 
3 Very much the same result would have obtained if the set of mutually projectable observations had been based 
on a production correspondence with patient days defined as an output rather than an input.   16
Figure 5: Effect on efficiency of defining patient days as an input  
















6. Concluding  remarks 
This contribution purports to compare the productive efficiency of a sample of German 
(Saxon) with a sample of Swiss hospitals using DEA. This comparison is of interest because it 
pits similarities with regard to culture and language against considerable institutional 
differences. These differences stem from a rather tight hospital planning imposed on Saxony 
following reunification in 1989 on the one hand and a strongly decentralized Swiss hospital 
sector, where regulatory authority continues to be mainly vested with and exercised in 
different degrees by member states (cantons), on the other. Specifically, patient migration is 
possible in Switzerland, making the number of cases treated an important indicator of success 
which should be reflected in DEA (Conclusion 1). Especially in the Swiss sample, an attempt 
is made to reduce the impact of possible reporting errors by imposing exclusion restrictions 
which on the whole serve to increase average size of the hospital. Even then, however, 
average size of the German units is found to be roughly the double of their Swiss 
counterparts, combined with much smaller ranges for inputs and outputs (Conclusion 2). Even 
with patient days included among the outputs, the German hospitals are clearly more efficient 
than their Swiss counterparts. Yet, the basic DEA assumption that the production possibility 
sets come from one and the same universe may not be tenable in this international 
comparison. For a test, the German hospitals are projected on a reference set comprised 
exclusively of Swiss observations, and conversely for the Swiss hospitals. Indeed, two-thirds 
of the Swiss observations cannot be projected on a reference set formed by German 
observations, whereas all German observations can be projected. Thus, the two production 
possibility sets appear to be largely disjoint (Conclusion 3).  
 
This finding suggests limiting the ensuing analysis to mutually projectable observations, 
resulting in even larger efficiency differences in favor of German hospitals. An international 
comparison may still be affected by inputs or outputs measured in value terms because of the 
choice of exchange rate influencing results. Dropping the one input in value terms leaves 
efficiency scores largely unaffected, suggesting robustness of results (Conclusion 4). Finally, 
two tests for assessing the importance of institutional differences are carried out. First, the 
number of beds does not really constitute a discretionary input in the case of Germany in view 
of strict hospital planning. Treating beds like a discretionary quantity should therefore serve 
to increase German efficiency scores more than Swiss scores. However, this prediction is not 
confirmed (Conclusion 5). Second, since patient days constitute a comparatively more 
important indicator of success in Germany, the German hospitals are advantaged when patient   17
days are shifted from the input to the output category. While patient days arguably belong to 
the input side, transferring them to the output side should result in a more marked increase of 
German efficiency scores. This prediction is confirmed (Conclusion 6). 
 
In sum, the application of DEA to hospitals operating in different institutional environments is 
fraught with great difficulties. However, it proved at least possible to establish comparable 
subsets, using the feasibility of projecting the observations of one group on a reference set 
formed by the other as the criterion. In those comparable cases, the efficiency gap between 
German and Swiss hospitals, measured in technical terms, widens even more. This difference 
may reflect the fact that patients in Switzerland have a larger choice of hospital without being 
exposed to cost differences. To the extent that inputs are valued by patients as relevant 
dimensions of quality, Swiss hospitals must provide them, resulting in excess inputs for a 
given output and therefore low DEA efficiency. 
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